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Abstract—Time variation during program execution can leak
sensitive information. Time variations due to program control
flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal
encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA.
A number of approaches to mitigate timing-based side-channel
attacks have been proposed including cache partitioning, control-
flow obfuscation and injecting timing noise into the outputs of
code. While these techniques make timing-based side-channel
attacks more difficult, they do not eliminate the risks. Prior
techniques are either too specific or too expensive, and all leave
remnants of the original timing side channel for later attackers
to attempt to exploit.
In this work, we show that the state-of-the-art techniques
in timing side-channel protection, which limit timing leakage
but do not eliminate it, still have significant vulnerabilities to
timing-based side-channel attacks. To provide a means for total
protection from timing-based side-channel attacks, we develop
Ozone, the first zero timing leakage execution resource for a
modern microarchitecture. Code in Ozone execute under a special
hardware thread that gains exclusive access to a single core’s
resources for a fixed (and limited) number of cycles during
which it cannot be interrupted. Memory access under Ozone
thread execution is limited to a fixed size uncached scratchpad
memory, and all Ozone threads begin execution with a known
fixed microarchitectural state. We evaluate Ozone using a number
of security sensitive kernels that have previously been targets
of timing side-channel attacks, and show that Ozone eliminates
timing leakage with minimal performance overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most fruitful hardware security vulnerability has
been timing-based side-channel attacks. A timing-based side-
channel attack1 is one in which the time it takes to perform
specific operations reveals information about secrets within the
system. There are three characteristics of modern systems that
enable timing-based side-channel attacks:
1. Variable-latency operations: In an effort to improve the
performance of a system, common operations are made to take
less time to execute than uncommon ones; thus, it becomes
possible to infer the constituency of instructions a program
executes simply by examining its latency. Furthermore, control
flow, speculation, caches, and a variety of other system features
render execution latencies that are a function of the program’s
code and data, thereby creating opportunities to learn about
such things. Kocher used this characteristic to attack RSA
authentication [11], after noting that early RSA implentations
performed different amounts of work for ”0” and ”1” key bits.
2. Resource sharing: To keep costs in check, functional and
storage resources in a modern microarchitecture are shared
concurrently among threads and processes; thus, it becomes
possible for an attacker program to create contention on these
resources and examine, by virtue of its own performance, the
extent to which the shared resources are utilized by the victim
program. Examples of resource sharing timing side-channel
attacks include L1 instruction cache based attacks [2], L1 data
cache based attacks [20], branch predictor based attacks [1]
and most recently last-level cache based attacks [17], [25].
1Some taxonomies of side-channel attacks create distinct categories for
cache and control flow attacks. Since these attacks are perpetrated to correlate
secrets to the timing of the cache or control flow, we broadly address all of
these attacks under the class of timing attacks.
3. Fine-grained performance monitoring: To facilitate de-
bugging and code optimization, modern systems provide high-
precision timing facilities, e.g., Intel’s rdtsc user-level cycle
counter read operation, and performance monitoring capabil-
ities. While most timing side-channel attacks make use of
high-precision timing facilities, performance counters (e.g.,
cache miss counters) have also been used in the past [12].
A. Mitigating Timing Attacks
There is a large body of work that has proposed various
techniques to mitigate timing-based side-channel attacks. We
broadly note that these techniques work to address each of
the above three system characteristics that leak timing infor-
mation. Variable-latency operations can be mitigated through
a variety of software and/or hardware measures to reduce
the data-dependent latency of a program. For example, some
efforts to reduce control flow dependence on data utilize
if-conversion and predicated execution to eliminate control
hammocks2 [7], [18], [21]. Other efforts work to lock down
critical data into the cache [24] or a scratchpad memory
[15] so as to reduce memory latency variability. While these
techniques work to limit the degree of data-dependent timing
variation in programs, they do not completely eliminate it since
a wide range of microachitectural features continue to perform
data-dependent optimizations, leading to attacks via branch
predictors [1] and cache conflicts [3], [5], among others.
To address resource sharing, techniques have proposed to
isolate programs to their own dedicated CPU and caches, so as
to eliminate potential competition for resources from other ag-
gressor threads, e.g. [6]. While these techniques can eliminate
aggressors at great cost, they still ultimately suffer from timing
leakage due to variable-latency operations that remain on the
single-threaded microarchitecture. As an example, Bernstein’s
cache attack on AES [3] works by monitoring how AES-
internal data cache conflicts vary with plaintext, thus making
the aggressor in this case the AES code itself.
Finally, to mitigate the problems of fine-grained perfor-
mance analysis, efforts have proposed time padding and ob-
fuscation to obscure the true activities of a program, e.g., [6],
[21]. The former technique delays results from a program such
that all results return after a fixed maximum delay. While this
approach eliminates timing differences, it doesn’t eliminate re-
source contention based attacks. Obfuscation techniques work
by injecting immense amounts of noise into the execution of
the program, through the use of extraneous memory accesses
and path executions, e.g., [21]. While these techniques do
attenuate timing leakage, they do so with enormous slowdown.
B. Eliminating Timing Attacks with Ozone
In this work, we build the first execution resource, called
Ozone, that exhibits zero timing leakage on a modern mi-
croarchitecture. Our approach is low cost, and it draws upon
earlier work in quelling control and data timing leakage, but
2A control hammock is a CFG construct where control diverges from a
single point based on a predicate and then reconverges again to a single point.
This construct is typically formed by IF and SWITCH statements.
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also introduces new techniques to silence microarchitectural
timing leakage. In the Ozone execution environment, vulner-
able codes, such as an AES kernel, will execute with a fixed
(and well known) latency regardless of inputs. To achieve zero
timing leakage, Ozone places restrictions on the code it can
execute (e.g., no CFG hammocks), thus, Ozone targets small
applications and/or security-sensitive potions of applications.
Specifically, Ozone achieves zero timing leakage using the
following measures to eliminate each of the three properties
that enable timing attacks: i) the Ozone compiler guarantees
that the instruction trace of an Ozone thread has a fixed
number of instructions executing on a fixed control path,
making the thread’s execution always independent of input
data, ii) Ozone codes execute under a special hardware thread
that gains exclusive access to a single core’s resources for a
fixed (and limited) number of cycles during which it cannot
be interrupted, iii) memory access is limited to a fixed size
uncached scratchpad memory, and iv) all Ozone threads begin
execution with a known fixed microarchitectural state.
The ultimate challenge for Ozone is to demonstrate that its
restrictive execution environment is capable of running codes
that are vulnerable to timing-based side-channel attacks. To
this end, we show in this work that we can efficiently execute
a wide range of known-vulnerable codes inside the Ozone
execution environment. To our knowledge, our benchmarks
represent the largest collection of known side-channel vul-
nerable codes analyzed to date, by a wide margin. Indeed,
the breadth of the codes analyzed makes a strong case for the
Ozone approach to stopping timing-based side-channel attacks.
Specifically, we make the following novel contributions:
• We begin by demonstrating the significant value of zero
timing leakage over state-of-the-art mitigation techniques
that only attenuate timing leakage. We show, using the
decade-old Bernstein’s cache attack, that state-of-the-art
timing side-channel mitigations are half measures.
• We detail the first low-cost implementation of an ex-
ecution mode for modern microarchitectures with zero
timing leakage, via the Ozone execution environment. In
addition, we demonstrate the utility of our approach by
porting a broad array of side-channel vulnerable applica-
tion components into the Ozone execution environment.
• We analyze the security and efficiency of the Ozone zero
timing leakage execution capability in the context of a
modern microarchitecture, by examining the performance
of the Ozone execution capability on the Gem5 detailed
microarchitecture simulator.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we demonstrate why state-of-the-art approaches to
attenuate timing leakage are not sufficient to protect program
secrets. Section 3 discusses the requirements for zero timing
leakage execution and details the Ozone architectural enhance-
ments. Section 4 gives details about the implementation of
Ozone, and performs security analysis of the Ozone execution
resource. Section 5 examines related work, and finally we
conclude in Section 6.
II. WHY ATTENUATING TIMING LEAKAGE IS NOT
ENOUGH
A number of techniques have been proposed to mitigate
timing-based side-channel attacks. One popular mitigation
technique is isolating security sensitive code execution. This
is done by allocating private resources to security sensitive
applications [6], [16], [24]. In [16], [24] hardware and software
mechanisms are used to partition caches into private regions
to mitigate cache-based timing side-channel attacks. Another
recent work by Braun et. al. [6] targets both control-flow and
resource contention based side-channel attacks. The method
uses time padding through delay loops to account for time vari-
ations due to different program paths. To provide protection
from cache-based timing attacks, the method reserves a core
for the duration of execution of a security sensitive function,
and it utilizes page coloring to reserve L3 cache resources.
While these techniques provide significant attenuation of
timing leakage, they all still leak some timing information,
in particular, due to their inability to fully control how mi-
croarchitectural state affects program timing. To demonstrate
that even small amounts of timing leakage creates significant
vulnerabilities, we show that a state-of-the-art timing leakage
mitigation technique is still susceptible to the decade-old
Bernstein cache attack [3]. We also show in this section that
the Ozone execution environment, detailed in the following
section, is not vulnerable to Bernstein’s cache attack (or any
other timing-based attack).
The Bernstein cache attack works by repeatedly running an
AES encryption kernel while only changing a single byte of
input plain text and then inferring key information based on
how that single change affects cache performance. As such,
there is no external adversary to build protections against,
instead, the AES kernel’s cache experiences interference from
itself (in the form of capacity and conflict misses), which
results in timing variations that expose key information.
Fig. 1. Equations for First Round AES Encryption.
Legend : K = 16 byte key, n = 16 byte plain text
s[i] = K[i]⊕ n[i], where i = 0 to 15
t0 = T0[s[0]]⊕ T1[s[5]]⊕ T2[s[10]]⊕ T3[s[15]]⊕ x0
t1 = T0[s[4]]⊕ T1[s[9]]⊕ T2[s[14]]⊕ T3[s[3]]⊕ x1
t2 = T0[s[8]]⊕ T1[s[13]]⊕ T2[s[2]]⊕ T3[s[7]]⊕ x2
t3 = T0[s[12]]⊕ T1[s[1]]⊕ T2[s[6]]⊕ T3[s[11]]⊕ x3
Specifically, the attack carefully manipulates indexing into
the AES key tables. Figure 1 shows the equations for the first
round of AES encryption as implemented in the OpenSSL
cryptographic library [19]. The implementation uses four key
tables (T0−T3). Accesses to these tables are derived from the
AES key. In the equations, (K) is the encryption key and (n)
is an input data to be encrypted. The table indexes are created
by XOR’ing a key byte (K[i]) with a plain text byte (n[i]).
To demonstrate how even attenuated timing leakage leaves
programs vulnerable, we perpetrated Bernstein’s cache attack
on an AES kernel with state-of-the-art protections while
running on a simulated processor model. The AES program’s
protections and cache configuration are similar to the one’s
used in [6]. The program is protected such that it contains
no input-dependent control, including a fixed number of loop
iterations. In addition, the AES kernel starts execution with
a flushed cache and reset branch predictor state. The simu-
lated caches are a 32KB L1 data cache, a 32KB instruction
cache and a 256KB L2 shared cache. We used the Gem5
microarchitectural simulator for our experiments [4]. The AES
encryption process is the only running process and the time
measurements are total execution times in cycles.
Figure 2 shows relative total execution time for AES en-
cryption as a function of s[0] = (K[0]⊕ n[0]). Each point in
the graph is obtained by averaging the total execution time
for 210 128-bit keys with a fixed value of n[0]. The total
execution times are given relative to the average execution
time for all values of n[0]. On the graph, we can see that
there is a slight variation in execution time across different
values of n[0]. This timing variation was sufficient to allow
us to fully recover the AES kernel’s secret key. For example,
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Fig. 2. Relative Execution Time of AES Encryption: The graph shows the
sorted relative total execution times for AES encryption as the value of an
input data byte, n[0], varies from 0 to 255, for a state-of-the-art protection
mechanism [6] and Ozone.
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Fig. 3. The Ozone Compiler: The Ozone compiler, built as a back-end phase
of LLVM, ensures that the code marked for Ozone execution i) has input-
independent control flow via if-conversion and control verification, and ii)
only accesses scratchpad memory.
from the graph, the maximum execution time is observed when
n[0] is 6. Therefore we can conclude that, for any unknown
key byte K[0], the maximum execution time is observed at
K[0] ⊕ n[0] = 6. By choosing different values for n[0] and
measuring total execution time, we could infer the value of
K[0]. We then repeated this process on the remainding key
bytes to fully recover the AES secret key.
Figure 2 also shows that the Ozone execution, running with
the same inputs as the baseline experiment, executes precisely
the same number of cycles regardless of changes to the input.
This property hold for both changes in the plain text and the
secret key values. Consequently, there is zero timing leakage
for the Ozone executions, and it is not possible to implement
Bernstein’s attack on an Ozone execution.
To summarize, in this section we showed that current mit-
igation techniques can only limit timing side channels due to
the inherent variable latencies associated with microarchitec-
tural features such as caches. We also showed that even highly
attenuated timing leakage can still reveal sensitive information.
As such, to fully stem the vulnerabilities of timing-based side-
channel attacks, an architecture that eliminates all sources of
timing variation is required.
III. THE OZONE ARCHITECTURE
The goal of Ozone is to eliminate all sources of timing side
channels and achieve zero timing leakage. This is achieved by
insuring that the execution of Ozone code (i.e., the portion of
code that we want protected from timing-based side-channel
attacks) executes the same number of cycles regardless of its
inputs. Moreover, the code’s run time cannot change due to
the activities of other threads and processes. By doing this, an
attacker will not be able to gain any input-related information
about code executing inside the Ozone execution resource.
In this section we will describe how the Ozone architecture
achieves zero timing leakage.
A. Threat Model
In this work, we model the adversary as an unprivileged
process that uses time variation in program execution to
extract sensitive information. We assume the adversary has
access to fine-grained timing information and microarchi-
tectural statistics such as CPU cycle count and cache miss
rates through performance monitoring counters. We assume
the hardware, hypervisor and operating system are trusted so
that the adversary doesn’t have direct read-write access to
memory that is not allocated to it. The system compiler is
not trusted, instead a small trusted verifier is used to verify
Ozone code generated by the compiler. Finally, we assume the
attacker will only pursue timing-based side-channel attacks,
thus we consider other side channels, such as power and
electromagnetics, beyond the scope of this work.
B. Removing Input-Related Code Variability
The first step in achieving zero leakage is eliminating all
sources of variable latency within the Ozone code. Assuming
fixed-latency instructions, this can be achieved by dynamically
executing the same trace of instructions independent of input
data. To guarantee the same dynamic trace, Ozone code control
flow must be independent of its inputs, which means i) control
hammocks (e.g., IF statements) are not allowed, and ii) loops
must execute a constant fixed number of iterations.
Control hammocks are removed by the Ozone compiler via
if-conversion of CFG hammocks, shown in Figure 3. With
if-conversion, all operations (except stores) on either side of a
conditional statement are executed regardless of the condition.
Store operations need special treatment because they must
avoid the potential side-effects of the false-predicate code.
Stores are handled using a special conditional assignment
function, CMOV. Listings 1 to 4 show two examples of
if-conversions that are common. Listing 1 shows a control
hammock with stores in both control paths. In this example,
prior to if-conversion, one of the two operations in the if and
else bodies are evaluated based on the condition input==0.
After if-conversion (as shown in Listing 2), both operations
are evaluated and a conditional assignment function is used to
select the final value to store. Listing 3 shows an unbalanced
control hammock (if-then construct), where only one path
performs a store operation. In this case, the conditional
branch is eliminated by evaluating the statement inside the if
body and by conditionally storing the new result or the old
value of y based on the condition (as shown in Listing 4).
i f ( i n p u t == 0){
y = a2 ;
}
e l s e {
y = a2 ∗ b ;
}
Listing 1. If-Then-Else Conver-
sion - Original Code
tv = a2 ;
fv = a2 ∗ b ;
p r ed = ( i n p u t == 0 ) ;
y = CMOV( pred , tv ,fv ) ;
Listing 2. If-converted Code with Fixed
Control
i f ( i n p u t == 0){
y = a ∗ b ;
}
Listing 3. If-Then Conversion
- Original Code
tv = a ∗ b ;
p r ed = ( i n p u t == 0 ) ;
y = CMOV( pred , tv ,y ) ;
Listing 4. If-converted Code with Fixed
Control
CMOV ( pred , tv , fv ){
mov tv ,% r a x / / Load t r u e v a l u e
cmp $0 , p red / / Check i f f a l s e
cmove fv ,% r a x / / Load f a l s e v a l u e ?
r e t u r n %r a x } / / Re tu rn s e l e c t e d v a l u e
Listing 5. Conditional Store Function for x86
-                                                      
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Fig. 4. The Ozone Architectural Extensions: The Ozone execution resource
ensures zero timing leakage for execution on a modern microarchitecture using
a few minor extensions to an existing core design.
The conditional assignment function (CMOV) used in the
if-conversions takes three inputs: a predicate value (pred), a
true value (tv) and a false value (fv), and returns either the true
value or the false value based on the value of the predicate.
It uses conditional move instructions such as the CMOVcc
instruction from the x86 architecture [10] to eliminate condi-
tional branches. Listing 5 shows an example implementation
of our conditional store for the x86 architecture.
After if-conversion by the Ozone compiler, all operations
are performed regardless of their predicate conditions. In
doing so, there can be cases where unchecked operations
could produce exceptions such as division-by-zero. The Ozone
compiler relies on the programmer to make sure that such
faulty operations do not occur. Since stores in the Ozone
execution environment always target the scratchpad (detailed
below), these stores are not subject to page faults, thus making
it trivial to ensure fault-free code.
Figure 3 summarizes the Ozone compilation process. The
input to the compiler is a programmer-annotated source code.
Programmers annotate functions they want protected from
timing-based side-channel attacks. In the first stage of the
compilation process, conditional branches are eliminated by
if-conversion. If-conversion is done on all annotated functions
and functions called from annotated functions. Then, the
control verification stage verifies that there are no conditional
branch instructions in the Ozone code except for loop con-
ditions with a fixed number of iterations and no early exits
through break and continue statements. Finally, all verified
Ozone code and associated data is placed in separate code
and data sections that map to scratchpad memory. At the
end of compilation, code with a fixed control path and data
accesses to a scratchpad memory is produced; with support
of the Ozone microarchitecture, this code will execute with a
fixed latency regardless of its inputs.
C. Eliminating Timing Leakage with Ozone
Even after eliminating input-related control flow in Ozone
code, the code will still be vulnerable to timing-based side-
channel attacks on a traditional microarchitecture due to
contention caused by resource sharing.
Ozone eliminates contention by i) gaining exclusive access
to the core’s execution units during execution of Ozone
code, ii) using fixed-latency instruction and data scratchpad
memories (ISPM and DSPM) instead of caches and iii) en-
suring all Ozone threads start execution with a known fixed
microarchitectural state.
Figure 4 shows the microarchitecture of a processor with an
Ozone hardware thread. The processor components are divided
into three groups. The first group of resources is exclusively
used by the Ozone thread (shown in green in Figure 4)
including the Ozone architectural registers and the watch-dog
timer (WDT). The second group, shown as half-green and half-
blue, is used by the Ozone execution resource exclusively for
the lifetime of an Ozone thread. These resources include the
instruction and data scratch-pad memories (ISPM and DSPM)
and the Ozone branch predictor. Once all Ozone threads are
destroyed, these resources can (optionally) be used by the rest
of the system. For instance, the ISPM and DSPM could be
allocated from a way of existing caches, for use by an Ozone
thread. The final group of resources, shown in blue in the
figure, are explicitly not used by Ozone threads as contention
on these resources could enable timing attacks. These off-
limit resources include the main branch predictor, caches, other
thread states, and DRAM.
An application that wants to use the Ozone resource,
first creates an Ozone thread by specifying the resources it
requires (ozone thread create). The resources requested in-
clude instruction and data scratchpad memory sizes (including
maximum stack space required for Ozone code execution), the
fixed number of cycles required to execute the Ozone code,
and a pointer to the Ozone code to load into the scratchpad
memory. Following the creation of a new Ozone thread, the
OS allocates instruction and data scratchpad memory space
(including stack space in the data scratchpad), zeros out the
allocated scratchpad memory, copies all read-only data into
the data scratchpad and the Ozone code to the instruction
scratchpad. The OS then returns a handle to the Ozone thread,
which is used by the application to invoke the thread.
When the Ozone thread is invoked by the main program (via
ozone thread invoke), the processor switches to the Ozone
thread context. This thread switch forces a flush of the proces-
sor pipeline (to eliminate reservation station contention with
the previous thread), and then enables the Ozone branch pre-
dictor with a fixed initial state. If the Ozone branch predictor
is a static predictor (e.g., predict always-taken), this predictor
initialization step can be skipped. The hardware context is
then switched to the Ozone thread and execution begins. A
watchdog timer (WDT) in the processor is started that keeps
track of the expected number of execution cycles for the Ozone
thread invocation. When the WDT expires, the timer interrupts
the Ozone thread, stopping execution. If execution completed
in the same cycle the WDT expires, the result of the execution
is returned, otherwise, the Ozone thread is terminated as it is
running too long or not long enough.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Ozone Implementation
The Ozone compiler is composed of if-converter and control
verifier stages. The compiler stages are implemented as IR
passes on the x86-targeted LLVM compiler [13]. The if-
conversion is implemented by replacing stores by a call to
the conditional assignment function as detailed in Section 3.
The Ozone microarchitecture is modeled using the Gem5
microarchitectural simulator [4]. Table I lists the configuration
for the baseline out-of-order core. Ozone is integrated into the
simulator as a special thread context, with the state detailed
in Section 3. Additionally, an always-taken predictor is im-
plemented for stateless prediction of Ozone code branches,
and instruction and data scratchpads are integrated into the
simulator at a fixed address.
B. Benchmark Applications
The benchmark applications used in our evaluation consti-
tute security sensitive applications that have previously been
subject to side-channel attacks. They are adapted directly from
widely used libraries: OpenSSL [19], GDK [8] and glibc [22].
Our intent with this benchmark suite is to demonstrate the
broad utility of the Ozone execution environment, thus, we
TABLE I
BASELINE MICROARCHITECTURE CONFIGURATION.
L1 Instruction Cache Size 32kB
L1 Data Cache Size 32kB
L2 Unified Cache Size 256kB
Cache Associativity 4-way
Issue Type Out-of-order
Issue Width 8
Branch Predictor Type Tournament
Branch Predictor Size 56kB
TABLE II
ANALYZED BENCHMARKS WITH SCRATCHPAD MEMORY REQUIREMENTS.
The table also lists references to attacks on each benchmark application.
Benchmark InstructionMemory Size
Data
Memory Size
Attack
Examples
AES-CBC 6.627K 12.16K [3], [5], [23]
AES-XTS 6.382K 12.16K [3], [5], [23]
GDK-Keymap 1.692K 6.728K [9]
RSA 13.909K 13.311K [11], [25], [26]
SHA512 3.308K 4.288K [14]
have ported into it all of the codes we could find that have
been previously attacked with timing-based side channels.
The benchmark applications include AES encryption, RSA
decryption, SHA512 hash kernel, and a key-mapping func-
tion (GDK-Keymap). Table II lists references to timing side-
channel attacks for each of the benchmark applications.
Table II shows the instruction and data memory require-
ments for the benchmark applications, including the maximum
stack space required. As can be observed from the table, the
kernels and their data can easily fit into small scratchpad
memories. For these codes, a 32kB instruction scratchpad and
a 64kB data scratchpad will hold all of these algorithms simul-
taneously (and eliminate the need for context switch saves),
and a 16kB instruction and data scratchpad will comfortably
hold any single application component.
C. Performance and Security Evaluation
We evaluated the security and performance of our bench-
mark codes running on the baseline out-of-order microarchi-
tecture and in the Ozone execution resource across many ran-
dom inputs. The inputs were varied in the following manner:
AES-CBC encrypts with 1024 random keys with random 128-
bit inputs, AES-XTC encrypts with 1024 random keys with
random 256-bit inputs, GDK-keymap maps all possible 784
keyboard codes, RSA decrypts a random 128-byte message
with 1024 random 1024-bit keys, and SHA512 hashes random
inputs from length 1 to 128 bytes.
Figure 5 shows the results of the security analysis of the
Ozone execution resource. The graphs show the performance
of the baseline microarchitecture (in blue) and that of the
Ozone execution (in orange) across a wide range of inputs,
with the results sorted and plotted from fastest execution to
the slowest. For each of the baseline experiments, the branch
predictor and caches are flushed prior to the start of execution.
It is interesting to note the timing leakage characteristics
of the baseline out-of-order executions. In all cases, there is
evidence of the performance of the program changing as the
inputs are varied. As expected, however, the Ozone executions
exhibit zero timing leakage, by demonstrating a fixed execu-
tion latency across all inputs. The Ozone executions are also
immune to aggressor thread perturbations since they utilize
static always-taken branch speculation and avoid use of the
TABLE III
COST ASSESSMENT. This table estimates the bit-area cost of the Ozone
execution resource.
Addition Cost (in bits) Optional?
Ozone mode bit 1 No
Ozone thread context 80 No
Instruction Scratchpad 32k x 8 Yes
Data Scratchpad 64k x 8 Yes
Expected Total Cost: 11 bytes ...to... 96kB
cache, all the while maintaining exclusive access to hardware
resources for the duration of the execution.
For most of the codes, exclusive access to the resources
(which also disables interrupts for the core) is a short duration,
on the order of 500-7500 cycles. The one outlier is RSA, which
requires more than 9.5M cycles. This would likely be too long
to completely ignore interrupts and exceptions. Thus, a system
integrating Ozone execution would likely dedicate it to only a
subset of cores, leaving the remaining cores in the system to
provide timely response to interrupts and exceptions.
The performance of the Ozone execution compares favor-
ably to the baseline out-of-order executions. In more than
half of the cases (3 of 5), the Ozone execution was more
efficient than the baseline execution. This is possible due
to faster scratchpad accesses (i.e., no cache misses), more
responsive branch prediction (i.e., the baseline tournament
predictor takes much longer to warm up compared to Ozone’s
stateless always-taken predictor), and fewer difficult-to-predict
if-statements (which are removed during if-conversion). Con-
versely, the executions of RSA and SHA512 were less efficient.
In the case of RSA, this was primarily due to significant over-
heads incurred during if-conversion, which requires that both
the true and false code of an IF statement be executed for all
occurrences. In the case of SHA512, the Ozone implementation
pads out the password being hashed to always 128 bytes, thus,
it performs the worst-case length hash for all inputs. This extra
work is unavoidable if one wants to conceal password length.
D. Ozone Resource Cost Assessment
Table III estimates the bit-area costs of implementing
the Ozone execution resource. The table shows the various
components necessary to implement Ozone threads and their
cost in bits. The table also indicates if the component is
required, as some of the components, in particular the scratch-
pad memories, can be temporarily borrowed from existing
microarchitectural resources (namely, the cache).
The overall cost of implementing the Ozone execution
resource can be kept quite low. In particular, if the instruction
and data scratchpad memories are acquired via reconfiguration
of the instruction and data caches (e.g., claim one way of
these caches), then the overall cost for a single Ozone thread
context is only 11 bytes (plus baseline thread state). With
additional Ozone thread contexts and dedicated instruction
and data scratchpad memories, implementation costs will grow
accordingly. However, even an Ozone implementation with full
dedicated resources will only require silicon area on the order
of the L1 instruction and data caches of an individual core
(approximately 96kb of storage).
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this work pushes the state-of-the-art in
timing-based side-channel resistant execution forward with
the Ozone execution resource. Unlike previous work, Ozone
implements a zero timing leakage execution capability, and it
does so with low area cost (as few as 11 bytes of state) and
significantly less performance impact than previous non-zero
timing-leakage proposals (no more than a 30% performance
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Fig. 5. Security Analysis of Ozone Executions: Each graph shows for each of the five benchmarks the performance variability across a wide range of inputs.
The baseline architecture performance (in blue) is shown for varied inputs sorted from fastest to slowest. The Ozone lines are always horizontal, meaning that
there is zero timing leakage as the timing is fixed for all tested inputs
loss for a modern microarchitecture). Our approach is to
map a carefully prepared input-independent code sequence,
built with the Ozone compiler, to a microarchitecture with
stateless Ozone branch predictors and small instruction and
data scratchpad memories. In this effort, we examine five
benchmarks pulled from the literature as being particularly
susceptible to side-channel attacks. The Ozone design allows
these codes to efficiently execute with a fixed number of cy-
cles, regardless of input, on even a complex microarchitecture.
By eliminating all sources of timing variation in the Ozone
execution environment, codes ported to it can rest assured that
their executions do not leak secrets via timing channels.
Looking ahead, we see a great opportunity to address
additional side channels with the Ozone execution resource.
In particular, if the Ozone execution resource were moved
into a physical co-processor, it could be designed with circuits
to minimize power side channels, while still retaining its
capability to execute code with zero timing leakage.
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